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Governance Reform – Institute of Technology Councils   
Liz Rainsbury, Pam Malcolm, Carol Hart 
Abstract 
This study examines the composition of the councils of New Zealand Institutes of Technology 
and Polytechnics prior to and subsequent to passing of the Polytechnics Education Amendment Act 
(PEAA). The Act reduced the size of councils, allowed greater government control over appointments 
and required council members to have appropriate skills and experience to improve the governance 
capability and effectiveness of ITP councils.  
The study compares the skills and experience of council members before during and after the 
implementation of the PEAA to assess the extent to which the member profile of councils has 
changed to reflect legislative intent.  
The study finds that councils now have members who are more highly qualified with greater 
experience in governance and operational roles. These changes are in line with the government’s 
objective of improving the financial viability of the ITP sector.  
However the move to greater stewardship has had trade-offs in terms of stakeholder 
representation. Maori representation on councils did not increase and some councils have no Maori 
representation. Additionally, ITP councils are still male dominated and there has been a decrease in 
the proportion of women appointed to them.  These are both areas where improvement is necessary.  
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1.0 Introduction  
This study examines the composition of councils of New Zealand Institutes of Technology and 
Polytechnics (ITPs) prior to and subsequent to the passing of the Education (Polytechnics) Amendment 
Act (EPA) (Education (Polytechnics) Amendment Act, 2009). Anne Tolley, the Minister of Tertiary 
Education at the time, explained that the purpose of the legislation was “to improve the governance 
capability and effectiveness of polytechnic councils” (Education (Polytechnics) Amendment Act, 2009) 
with the aim of having a financially viable ITP sector providing high-quality education outcomes for the 
community (New Zealand Parliament, 2009). The EPA legislation moved councils from a 
stakeholder/representative governance model (Edwards, 2003) to a more stewardship-based model.   
The EPA significantly changed the composition of the councils by reducing the number of 
council members to eight; four members are now appointed by the Minister and these members in turn 
appoint four other council members. Previous legislative requirements, for councils to have 
representation from staff, students, unions and Maori, were removed. The amendment also provided 
flexibility for councils to combine and have council members appointed to more than one ITP council.  
The purpose of the study is to assess the change in composition of ITP councils prior to and 
following the passing of the EPA. The reported skills and experience of ITP council members are 
compared and contrasted to assess the extent to which the member profile of councils has changed in 
reaction to the legislative changes and to assess whether “governance capability” has improved. The 
study of the effects of the changes in the ITP sector will provide guidance for policymakers if similar 
changes are proposed for other tertiary providers such as universities (Grey, 2012).  The findings will 
also be of interest to councils when considering appointments and to senior executives in the education 
sector. 
The study finds that the profile of council members has changed. Council members have more 
qualifications and more governance experience.   
The structure of the paper is summarised as follows. Section 2.0 provides the background to 
tertiary education providers in New Zealand.  Section 3.0 reviews the concepts of corporate governance 
and briefly reviews corporate governance in the public sector, with particular attention given to 
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governance of tertiary education institutions in New Zealand. Section 4.0 describes the population and 
research method. This is then followed by a comparison in section 5.0 of the council member attributes 
pre and post implementation of the EPA. Key findings are then discussed and conclusions made in 
section 6.0.    
2.0 Background to tertiary education providers in New Zealand  
New Zealand’s tertiary education institutions provide all post-school education and training, 
offering programmes that range from transition (school to work) through to postgraduate study and 
research.  The tertiary sector covers universities, ITPs, private training establishments (PTEs), Wänanga 
and workplace training. The institutions are established in New Zealand under the Education Act 1989 
(Education Act, 1989),  which specifies the constitution, functions and duties of councils.  
Universities provide academic research-led programmes. ITPs deliver education at the technical, 
professional and vocational level and produce research which is applied and technical. PTEs are not 
government funded and are generally niche players focusing on offering pre-degree qualifications in a 
particular vocational area e.g, hospitality. Wänanga are educational institutions that deliver Māori 
subjects, in an an environment that focuses specifically on the needs of Māori learners. Workplace 
training, such as the training of apprentices, is overseen by Industry Training Organisations (ITOs). 
ITOs set standards and arrange delivery of industry training for the sector it represents (New Zealand 
Qualifications Authority, 2013). 
Provision of education is one of the largest areas of government expenditure in New Zealand, 
education spending reaching 12.4 billion dollars for the 2012 financial year (New Zealand Treasury, 
2012), with around four billion dollars allocated to the tertiary sector (Ministry of Education, 2013). 
According to the OECD statistics in 2009, New Zealand’s total public education (tertiary) spending is 
7.4 per cent (1.6%) of gross domestic product compared with the OECD average of 6.2 per cent (1.6%).   
In 2011, according to the latest statistics available from the Ministry of Education (2012), there 
were 18 ITPs with 157,000 students enrolled, of which 12,700 were international students. This 
represented 78,500 effective full time students (Ministry of Education, 2012). 
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3.0 Literature Review  
3.1 Concepts of corporate governance  
At a broad level corporate governance refers to how organisations are governed and directed, and 
the systems that are in place to hold the organisation accountable (Chambers & Cornforth, 2010; Farrar, 
2008).   According to Edwards (2003) corporate governance is “about the structures, processes and 
relationships that are used in making decisions” (p.11).  At a basic level corporate governance is 
concerned with who makes decisions in an organisation, how these decisions affect the running of the 
organisation, and how those who make the decisions can be held accountable.  It involves establishing 
structures where objectives are set, strategies implemented and performance is monitored. It is also 
about relationships between management, the governing body and the equity holders and other 
stakeholders (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004).  
(Edwards, 2002) argues that corporate governance is best understood in terms of what it should 
create and encourage in an organisation if it is functioning correctly, i.e. “accountability, transparency, 
participation, relationship management and, depending on the context, efficiency and/or equity” (p.52). 
In another paper, Edwards (2003) states that in the context of tertiary education institutes, corporate 
governance also extends to the internal and external relationships within the organisations and the 
connections between these.  
There are a number of corporate governance theoretical frameworks that look at the processes 
involved from differing perspectives.  Frequently used frameworks include: 
Agency Theory 
Agency theory, as a governance issue was discussed by (M.  Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Principals (shareholders) delegate the management of day-to-day operations to managers (agents) who 
act on behalf of shareholders (principals).  An assumption of agency theory is that the interests of the 
agent and principal can conflict. The principal wishes to maximise wealth while the agent may act in 
their own self-interest.  Incentives, contracts and monitoring mechanisms are put in place by the 
principals to align the interest of both parties (Solomon, 2007). 
From an agency perspective boards of directors have an important role in organisations for 
monitoring senior executives on behalf of shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1999).   M Jensen (1993) considers 
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the board of directors to be the apex of a firm’s internal control system and has the ultimate 
responsibility for the operation of the firm. Fama and Jensen (1983) assert that a board of directors 
should be structured to include inside and outside (independent) directors. Inside directors are internal 
managers who have specific information about the firm. The role of independent board members is to 
resolve disagreements between internal mangers and to undertake tasks that involve conflicts of 
interests between internal managers and shareholders such as appointing and remunerating senior 
executives and by reviewing the financial statements. 
Resource dependency theory 
The resource dependency theory of organisations was developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978).  
The underlying assumption of resource dependency theory is that an organisation's survival depends on 
its ability to acquire and maintain resources both within and outside an organisation. The theory 
assumes that organisations are not self-sufficient and are dependent on resources from other 
organisations. This drives organisations to engage with other organisations in different ways (Drees & 
Heugens, 2013).   It also leads to organisations altering their organisational goals and structures, such as 
boards, to acquire necessary resources.  
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) identify four areas in which boards of directors can benefit 
organisations: advice and counsel, channels of information flow, preferential access to resources, and 
legitimacy. Hillman, Withers, and Collins (2009), in a review of resource dependency research, confirm 
that empirical work strongly supports these assertions.    
Stakeholder theory 
According to stakeholder theory there are a number of groups within an organisation that have a 
stake in its running and success, including its employees, suppliers, customers, and local community. 
Organisations have duties to these groups beyond that required by law (Heath & Norman, 2004).  The 
shareholders, though important, are just another stakeholder group that the organisation has a duty to. 
However in corporate situations, the shareholders have the most power as they are able to elect or 
dismiss the board of directors, and have a direct influence on the running of the business. In contrast, 
stakeholder theory within governance theory is about how specific groups should exercise oversight and 
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control over management. In practical terms, it is about which groups, in addition to shareholders, 
should be represented on the board, and how the board should function (Heath & Norman, 2004).  
M. C. Jensen (2001) criticises stakeholder theory because of its lack of a single objective function 
which makes it impossible for managers to make purposeful decisions. The theory requires managers to 
take account of the interests of stakeholders in decision-making but it does not specify how managers 
make trade-offs between the various competing and conflicting stakeholder interests.  He recommends 
enlightened stakeholder theory where maximisation of the long-run value of an organisation is the basis 
for making trade-offs between stakeholders.   
Stewardship theory 
Stewardship theory views managers not as self-interested individuals but as stewards of the 
organisation’s assets who are loyal to that organisation (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). In contrast to 
agency theory, stewardship theory posits that managers take a more holistic view and care about the 
entire organisation, and are thus motivated out of their desire to see it function properly and effectively 
(Chambers & Cornforth, 2010). As a result Board members will work with management to direct the 
organisation and put in place the appropriate strategies to ensure it improves. Thus, the emphasis, for 
the Board, is not on monitoring but on setting up appropriate organisational structures and strategies to 
facilitate high performance  (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  
 
3.2 Corporate governance and the public sector  
The concept of corporate governance is not confined to private sector business. It has been 
extended to the public sector with governing boards appointed to oversee public sector operations.  
Since the 1980s in the United Kingdom, there has been a move away from elected public sector 
boards to appointed boards, with appointments based on the private sector governance reforms 
(Chambers & Cornforth, 2010).  The New Public Management (NPM) reforms were intended to run 
public organisations similarly to private ones by making them more efficient and profitable, and 
ensuring greater accountability (O'Donnell, O'Brien, & Junor, 2011).   Hood (1995) identifies seven 
elements of the NPM changes: disaggregation into corporatized units, more competition between public 
sector bodies and the private sector, private sector styles of management e.g. bonuses, greater focus on 
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resource use, more hands-on management by senior executives, measurable standards of performance, 
and greater emphasis on outputs not inputs.    
This movement has extended to other countries such as Australia and New Zealand where 
governments have implemented systems and processes similar to the private sector in the corporate 
governance of its agencies (Edwards, 2002). Chambers and Cornforth (2010) point out that all 
organisations within the public sector are “subject to a degree of political direction and control from 
government” (p.2) meaning they are never fully independent. What is key to understanding corporate 
governance in the public sector is the level of government intervention and control over the governance 
of public organisations such as educational institutions.   
 
3.3 Corporate governance in the education sector 
The issue of corporate governance in the education sector, particularly when it comes to 
government intervention in the educational institutes, is a complicated one. Modern understandings of 
the University, for example, are based around the idea of “a distinctive social institution which deserves 
special status in terms of autonomy and academic freedom based on a ‘social compact’ that evolved 
between higher education and the state society” (p.7) (Enders, de Boer, & Weyer, 2013). Yet the special 
status in the ‘social compact’ has significantly decreased in recent years, as government intervention in 
educational institutes has increased in an effort to enhance their efficiency, and perhaps most 
importantly, their profitability. Changes in regulation and funding in recent years have reflected 
changes in the education system where a higher percentage of the population is accessing and 
participating in higher education, causing universities to function in a ‘market-like’ environment 
(Enders et al., 2013).    
One of the key trends in tertiary education in OECD countries is an increased focus on 
accountability and performance, with an emphasis on quality, which began in the 1980’s (Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2008).  Shore and Taitz (2012) argue that in 
New Zealand and across the OECD, governments have increasingly taken a hands-on approach to 
universities as they move towards a vision of them as a “transnational business corporation whose 
primary purposes are to generate revenue, develop research that is deemed ‘relevant’ to the economic 
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and political objectives of the state, and train students to become flexible workers whose skills meet the 
needs of employers in the global knowledge economy”  (p.205-206). 
Tertiary education in New Zealand has had a number of reforms. In the early to mid-1980s it 
was an elite system with low student participation rates. From the mid-1980s and 1990s, there was an 
increased emphasis on a competitive market based model with increased student participation rates.  In 
the 2000s, the competitive model remains but operating within a central framework setting education 
strategy and education priorities (McLaughlin, 2003).  The government’s present vision for tertiary 
education is set out in the Tertiary Education Strategy 2010-2015 (Ministry of Education, 2010).  The 
policy document identifies seven priority areas including “improving the educational and financial 
performance of providers” (p.10) (Ministry of Education, 2010). 
In the 1990’s there was criticism from the Ministry of Education, Treasury and the Business 
Roundtable about the structure of councils for tertiary education. Councils were argued to be too large 
to operate effectively, and their members lacked the necessary experience for strong stewardship. The 
presence of internal stakeholders – the chief executive, staff and student representatives - created 
serious conflicts of interest in terms of the appointment and remuneration of the CEO and remuneration 
of staff (Boston, 2007).  The stakeholder approach was considered inappropriate for good stewardship 
of tertiary education institutions. Boston (2007) quotes from a Victoria University Working Party on 
Governance:  
“A strong argument can be made that the governing body should focus on its roles as 
stewards and trustees…and not made up in a representative fashion by stakeholders. The 
membership of the governing body should instead be expertise based: academic, 
financial, management, legal, fund raising, community relations etc”. (p.18).  
 
2.5 The Education (Polytechnics) Amendment Act 
The EPA was passed in 2009 and amended the EA sections 171 and 222 to improve the 
“governance capability and effectiveness of polytechnic councils” (p.1) (New Zealand Parliament, 
2009).  
In summary, the EPA: 
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1. requires council members to have appropriate skills and experience in order to fulfil the 
governance responsibilities of the council – Section 222AD Education Act (1989); 
2.  Duties are placed on council members to act with honesty and integrity and in the interests of 
the council - section 222AH Education Act (1989); 
3. It is desirable for a council to be inclusive of Maori and reflect the ethnic and socioeconomic 
diversity of the community - section 222AD Education Act (1989) ;  
4. limits the size of councils to eight members; four appointed by the Minister of Education and 
four appointed by the councils - section 222AA  Education Act (1989); 
5. permits the Minister to appoint a chairperson or deputy chairperson if a council has not made 
these appointments. The Minister also has the power to dismiss a chairperson or deputy chairperson 
- section 222AG   Education Act (1989) ; 
6. allows collaborative governance arrangements, enabling councils to combine ( section 222AL ) 
and council members to sit on more than one council (section 222AC).  (Education Act, 1989) 
Prior to the passing of the EPA, polytechnic councils could have a minimum of 12 and a 
maximum of 20 members. An ITP council had to include the following members: four government 
appointed individuals, the chief executive, at least one elected academic and one general staff member, 
a student representative, and members supported by employer and labour organisations  - section 171 
(2) Education Act (1989).  The change to requiring council members to have appropriate skills and 
experience for governance purposes - section 222AD Education Act (1989) moved polytechnic councils 
from following a representative-based governance model to one that is a more skills-based, stewardship 
model. 
A reduction in the number of council members was considered appropriate to improve the 
effectiveness of councils. However, some members of parliament opposed the reduction in numbers 
arguing that regional interests and influences would be weakened by removing local, employer and 
union representation on the boards (New Zealand Parliament, 2009), (Trevett C, 2009). The opposition 
argued that: “At a time when jobs and skills should be a top priority, Anne Tolley has moved to rob 
polytechnics of the stakeholder input they need to ensure they are doing the best job possible” (Trevett 
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C, 2009).  The Maori Party, the government’s coalition partner, also pulled their support from the 
legislation due to the lack of Maori representation on the boards (Trevett C, 2009). 
 Opponents to the legislation believed that the government could exercise too much control over 
ITPs with four out of the eight council members appointed by the crown. 
 
2.6 Board capability 
The EPA requires council members to have appropriate skills and experience. New Zealand’s 
Corporate Governance Principles and Guidelines (2004) outlines that effective boards require a 
balance of independence; knowledge and skills, experience and perspectives which may vary from 
organisation to organisation. But what are the core knowledge, skills and experience required?   
In the academic literature Hillman, Cannella, and and Paetzold (2000) and Hillman et al. (2009) 
apply a resource dependence perspective to the director’s role to develop a taxonomy of attributes. They 
apply the taxonomy to airlines undergoing regulatory change. They identify four categories of director 
expertise: insiders that provide information about the firm, business experts that provide expertise for 
internal decision making processes within firms, support specialists that provide external links to 
support strategy, and community influencers that provide connections to community and government 
organisations. 
In contrast Singh, Terjesen, and Vinnicombe (2008), use a human capital perspective to develop 
a taxonomy of an individual director’s knowledge, skills and experiences and how these capabilities 
contribute to a firm. The taxonomy includes director education levels, board of director and executive 
director experience, career experience, reputation and status. The taxonomy is applied to examine 
gender differences of newly appointed directors of large listed companies in the United Kingdom.  
Van der Walt and Ingley (2003) develop a taxonomy based on board diversity with members 
bringing a range of attributes, characteristics and expertise to the performance of their roles. Various 
categories of diversity are identified along with their perceived importance for public and private sector 
firms. 
In a review of New Zealand tertiary governance Edwards (2003) concluded that council members 
should have the following skills or experience: knowledge of the tertiary education sector and the needs 
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of the community/region which the tertiary education institution serves, governance experience, 
financial management skills, strategic management/planning skills, and the ability to implement 
strategy. These skills are similar to those listed by Lockhart (2009) for governing bodies in the not- for-
profit sector: financial and legal knowledge, strategic thinking, visionary leadership, the acceptance of 
responsibility, a commitment to transparency, enthusiasm for the organisation and a desire to serve.  
The New Zealand Institute of Directors (Institute of Directors in New Zealand, 2007) identified 
seven key personal competencies for effective non-executive directors. These are general competencies, 
strategic competencies, analytical competencies, operational competencies, character competencies, 
communication/interaction competencies and knowledge competencies. 
A taxonomy of board member skills, identified in the literature examined, is contained in Table 1. 
  
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Although the authors identify the attributes from different perspectives there is agreement 
in some areas. Skills and knowledge sought after include knowledge of the sector and previous 
commercial experience. Financial literacy is important along with technical skills and 
expertise. A range of qualities are listed with some importance given to leadership, reputation, 
independence/objectivity, ethical standards, teamwork and communications skills.  
 
4.0 Sample and Data Collection  
The entire population of ITP council members was examined from 2009 to 2011. ITPs registered 
in New Zealand are listed on the NZQA website (New Zealand Qualifications Authority, 2013). The 
three years selected cover the pre and post implementation of the EPA legislation. The first year 2009 is 
prior to the legislation. The second year 2010 is a year of transition as the change in the constitution of 
ITP councils was made effective on 1 March 2010 – Section 16, Education (Polytechnics) Amendment 
Act (2009)  .  The third year, 2011, year is post implementation of the new requirements.   
12 
 
Data on each ITP council member was collected over this period from publicly available sources. 
The sources included the annual reports and websites of ITPs and internet searches of individual council 
members using on-line sources such as the New Zealand Business Who’s Who (NZBWW, 2013), and 
the NZ Companies Office website.(Ministry of Business Innovation & Employment, 2013) In total 542 
council member profiles were reviewed and collated.  
Data was collected on council members’ age, gender, ethnicity, academic qualifications, 
governance, work and sector experience. Also noted was whether there was any distinction in these 
areas between government and non-government appointees. The list of attributes was compiled based 
on a review of the literature that developed taxonomies of director attributes from different perspectives 
as discussed in section 3.0 However, our data collection was limited by the availability of public 
information on council members and the lack of consistency in the disclosures. It was surprising to note 
how little is disclosed in ITPs annual reports about the backgrounds of their council members.  
In the collection of 2011 data it was sometimes difficult to ascertain whether a member’s 
appointment represented a certain stakeholder group. This was particularly the case for Māori 
representation; in this situation if a member was listed as a trustee of a Māori trust this was interpreted 
as Māori representation.   
To ensure consistency of comparison, data on council members was collected at the ITP annual 
balance dates, 31 December each year.  
 
4.0 Data Analysis 
Table 2 records the number of council members for each ITP from 2009 to 2011 as reported in 
annual reports. In 2009 there were 256 council members, compared to 144 members in 2011. In 2011, 
all ITPs had eight council members showing that implementation of the new legislation was complete.  
The data analysis describes the overall profile of the 18 ITP councils which may differ from 
individual ITPs. This limitation should be taken into account when evaluating the results.   
The gender composition of council members is shown in Table 3, Panel A. The gender balance 
has shifted slightly over the period. Female council members comprised 38 per cent of the council 
member population in 2009, and 35 per cent in 2011.  The drop in female representation contrasts with 
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demand to increase the proportion of women that serve on governing bodies (Women on Boards New 
Zealand Ltd). The proportion is much lower than the 41.1 per cent of women appointed on government 
statutory boards as reported by the Human Rights Commission (Human Rights Commission, 2012).  
Table 3, Panel B shows the gender balance for government appointments to be even lower at an overall 
average of 31.5 per cent. 
The amended EA, section 222D states that “it is desirable in principle that a polytechnic council 
should include Māori”. During the legislative process concern was raised that a “desire” was not 
sufficient to ensure that Maori representation was maintained (New Zealand Parliament, 2009a). Table 
4 shows that there was a slight drop in the proportion of Māori representation on ITP councils. In 2011 
there were only 17 identified Māori council members serving on the 19 ITP Councils which suggesting 
that there were at least two Councils without a Māori member.  The number of Government appointed 
Māori members has not changed over the three years and represents a third of the Māori appointments, 
indicating that there is a greater likelihood of Māori being appointed to Councils in the non-government 
appointments.  
The EPA requires that council members have appropriate skills and experience to fulfil the 
governance responsibilities of the council. Tables 5 through 8 analyse the skills and experience of 
council members in different ways. 
Profiles of council member were reviewed to identify the educational qualifications of council 
members. The results are shown in Table 5. Over the three years the proportion of members who are 
university graduates has increased substantially from 56 per cent in 2009 to 74 per cent in 2011. A 
slightly higher number come from government appointments. Hence the makeup of councils has 
changed from having just over half of members with tertiary qualifications to nearly three-quarters. This 
proportionate increase is partly due to councils no longer being required to have student, general staff 
and union representation on the councils (see section 3.3).  
Table 6 shows the sector experience possessed by members on councils. The Australian and New 
Zealand Standard Industrial Classification was applied to analyse the data. In 2011, 44 per cent of 
council members have backgrounds in the professional, scientific and technical services and a greater 
number of these are government-appointed. This total is a significant increase from 24 per cent in 2009. 
14 
 
This sector includes legal, accounting and management consulting services which are often sought in 
governance roles. In particular, the increase in accounting and finance backgrounds accords with the 
government desire to improve the financial viability of the ITP sector. The proportion of members with 
education and training backgrounds increased from 16 to 22 per cent reflecting the emphasis on 
education. In 2011 the government appointments in this sector are only slightly higher than those from 
non-government appointments but have increased over the three year period from four per cent to 10 
percent. Other sectors did not fluctuate greatly over the three year period.  . 
Table 7 examines the professional work experience of council members. The board profiles show 
that the proportion of members with a management background increased from 25 per cent in 2009 to 
28 per cent in 2011. While the government appointments increased from six to 14 per cent, the non-
government appointments dropped slightly from 18 to 15 per cent. The largest increases were in the 
accounting and finance-banking area which together have increased from 13 per cent in 2009 to 25 per 
cent in 2011, and this increase is reflected substantially in the government appointees.  
Table 8 looks at prior senior experience in governance and senior executive positions in 
organisations. Panel A shows that director experience has increased from just over 40 per cent in 2009 
to 62 per cent in 2011. The larger increase is from the government appointees, from 16 per cent in 2009 
to 36 per cent in 2011. In addition members with trustee experience has increased from 7% to 10%. 
Overall the council member profiles show a significant increase in governance experience. As would be 
expected, very few government appointees have no previous experience whereas the number of non-
government appointees with no experience is significantly higher (23 compared to 9). Similarly 
executive experience has increased as shown in Table 8, Panel B. Members who had a role as a CEO or 
Managing Director in an organisation have increased from 44 per cent in 2009 to 59 per cent in 2011. 
This increase is largely reflected in the government appointees. Divisional manager experience also 
increased over this time period from 16 to 22 per cent. These increases in representation indicate that 
the composition of ITP Councils are changing to meet the requirements of the EPA improve governance 
capability and financial viability . 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
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The New Zealand government introduced legislation to change the size and composition of 
councils in order to improve the governance and financial viability of the ITP sector. This change in 
governance focus moved ITPs from a representative (stakeholder) model to a stewardship model where 
councils are made more accountable for performance. This study has assessed the change in the profile 
of council members over a three year period from 2009-2011 covering the introduction, transition and 
completion of the EPA changes.  
Our analysis shows that proportion of members with governance capability has significantly 
improved with 63% of total members with previous director experience and 58% with senior executive 
experience. In addition, management is the most frequent work experience background for council 
members.  
Councils have a greater proportion of accounting expertise with the proportion of members with 
accounting and finance backgrounds increasing from 13 per cent to 25 per cent. This change should 
improve the financial literacy of councils and accountability of the ITPs with respect to financial 
performance  
Overall, the results show that ITP councils have responded to the legislative changes to appoint 
council members who have “appropriate skills and experience in order to fulfil the governance 
responsibilities of the council” section 222AD Education Act (1989).  Councils have a higher 
proportion of members with experience as directors and senior executive roles and members with 
backgrounds in accounting finance. This improvement is largely reflected in the government appointees 
to Council more than the non-government appointees. 
However, the move away from a representative governance model has had some negative 
impacts. There has not been an increase in Maori representation despite the desire in the legislation to 
see this happen, and some ITPs had no Maori representation. In addition the proportion of women on 
councils is not representative of the underlying population and falls short of the representative 41.1 per 
cent suggested by the Human Rights Commission. These are areas where it would be good to see some 
future improvement. 
An area for future research is to consider the impact of the changes in board size and capability 
on the education and financial performance of ITPs. This is our focus for the future.   
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Table 1: Taxonomy of Director Attributes 
 Lockhart 
(2009) 
Singh, 
Terjesen and 
Vinnicombe 
(2008) 
Van der 
Walt and 
Ingley 
(2003) 
Hillman, 
Cannella 
and 
Paetzold 
(2000) 
New 
Zealand 
Institute of 
Directors 
(2007) 
Skills and Knowledge:      
Commercial and industry experience     
Previous sector experience      
Professional background     
Technical skills and expertise      
Previous executive/management 
experience 
     
Financial literacy      
Analytical Judgement      
      
Qualities:      
Leadership      
Maturity      
International experience      
High level of education      
Reputation/status      
Ability to work in a team     
Life Experience     
Independence     
Discipline     
High Ethical Standards      
Entrepreneurial Talent      
Common Sense      
Capable Communicator      
Commitment      
Courage      
Objectivity      
      
Personal Attributes:      
Age     
Gender     
Ethnicity     
Culture     
Religion     
Constituency Representation     
Access to important contacts in the 
community 
     
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Table 2: Population of ITP Council Members  
 2009 2010 2011 
Aoraki Polytechnic 13 8 8 
Bay of Plenty Polytechnic 15 8 8 
Christchurch Polytechnic Institute of Technology 16 8 8 
Eastern Institute of Technology 16 8 8 
Manukau Institute of Technology 15 8 8 
Nelson Marlborough Institute of Technology 15 7* 8 
Northland Polytechnic 14 8 8 
Open Polytechnic 12 8 8 
Otago Polytechnic 15 8 8 
Southland Institute of Technology 12 8 8 
TaiPoutini Polytechnic 13 8 8 
The Open Polytechnic 12 8 8 
Unitec Institute of Technology 15 8 8 
Universal College of Learning 14 8 8 
Waiariki Institute of Technology 20 7** 8 
Waikato Institute of Technology 13 8 8 
Wellington Institute of Technology 14 8 8 
Western Institute of Technology Taranaki 12 8 8 
Whitireia Community Polytechnic 12 8 8 
Total 256 142 144 
*An eight member of the NMIT Council, was appointed in February 2011 following consultation with Iwi. 
** A council members resigned in October 2010 
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Table 3: Demographics  
Panel A: Gender 
 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 
 n % n % n % 
Female 98 38 42 30 51 35 
Male 158 62 100 70 93 65 
Total 256 100 142 100 144 100 
 
Panel B: ITP Council Government Appointments - 2011 
 
 
No. of 
Government 
Appointments 
No. of Female 
Government 
Appointments 
% of Female 
Government 
Appointments 
Aoraki Polytechnic  4 0 0 
Bay of Plenty Polytechnic  4 1 25 
Christchurch Polytechnic Institute of Technology  4 2 50 
Eastern Institute of Technology  4 2 50 
Manukau Institute of Technology  4 1 25 
Nelson Marlborough Institute of Technology  4 1 25 
Northland Polytechnic  4 1 25 
Otago Polytechnic  4 3 75 
Southern Institute of Technology  5 1 20 
Tai Poutini Polytechnic  4 0 0 
The Open Polytechnic of New Zealand  4 1 25 
Unitec Institute of Technology 4 3 75 
Universal College of Learning (UCOL)  4 1 25 
Waiariki Institute of Technology  4 1 25 
Waikato Institute of Technology  4 2 50 
Wellington Institute of Technology  4 1 25 
Western Institute of Technology at Taranaki  4 1 25 
Whitireia Community Polytechnic Council  4 1 25 
Total  72 22 30.5 
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Table 4 Ethnicity 
 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 
 n % n % n % 
All appointments       
Non-Maori 221 86 125 88 127 88 
Maori 35 14 17 12 17 12 
Total 256 100 142 100 144 100 
       
Government appointments       
Non-Maori 
Maori 
62 
6 
24 
3 
65 
6 
46 
4 
66 
6 
46 
4 
Total 68 27 71 50 72 50 
       
Non-government appointments       
Non-Maori 
Maori 
159 
29 
62 
11 
60 
11 
42 
8 
61 
    11    
42 
8 
Total 188 73 71 50 72 50 
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Table 5: Education  
 
 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 
 n % n % n % 
All appointments       
PhDs 17 7 18 13 20 14 
Masters  40 16 33 23 34 24 
Bachelors 85 33 51 36 53 37 
Sub-total  142 56 102 72 107 75 
Diplomas and Certificates 18 7 8 6 9 6 
Not available  47 18 32 23 28 19 
Prior ITP representation – see below 49 19 0 0 0 0 
Total 256 100 142 100 144 100 
       
Government appointments       
PhDs 3 1 11 8 11 8 
Masters  13 5 18 13 19 13 
Bachelors 32 13 26 18 26 18 
Sub-total  48 19 55 39 56 39 
Diplomas and Certificates 6 2 3 2 3 2 
Not available  14 5 13 9 13 9 
Subtotal 68 27 71 50 72 50 
       
Non-government appointments       
PhDs 14 5 7 5 9 6 
Masters  27 11 15 11 15 10 
Bachelors 53 21 25 18 27 19 
Sub-total  94 37 47 33 51 36 
Diplomas and Certificates 12 5 5 4 6 4 
Not available  33 13 19 13 15 10 
Subtotal 139 54 71 50 72 50 
       
Prior ITP representation       
Academic Staff Rep 17 7 0 0 0 0 
Allied Staff Rep 16 6 0 0 0 0 
Student Rep 16 6 0 0 0 0 
Subtotal 49 19 0 0 0 0 
       
Total 256 100 142 100 144 100 
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Table 6: Sector Experience  
 
 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 
 n % n % n % 
All appointments       
Professional, scientific & technical 62 24 57 40 63 44 
Education & training 41 16 27 19 31 22 
Public administration and safety 27 11 13 9 10 7 
Other services 24 9 9 6 7 5 
Maori trust 15 6 8 6 8 6 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 12 5 8 6 5 3 
Wholesale, retail and other services 10 4 9 6 10 7 
Administrative & support 8 3 4 3 3 2 
Electricity, gas, water and waste 3 1 2 1 2 1 
Manufacturing 4 2 4 3 4 3 
Construction 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Prior ITP representation* 49 19 0 0 0 0 
Total 256 100 142 100 144 100 
       
Government appointments       
Professional, scientific & technical 32 13 36 25 37 26 
Education & training 9 4 13 9 14 10 
Public administration and safety 4 2 4 3 4 3 
Other services 6 2 2 1 2 1 
Maori trust 3 1 2 1 2 1 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1 0 2 1 2 1 
Wholesale, retail and other services 6 2 6 4 5 3 
Administrative & support 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Electricity, gas, water and waste 3 1 2 2 2 1 
Manufacturing 1 0 3 2 3 2 
Construction 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Subtotal 68 27 71 50 72 50 
       
Non-government appointments       
Professional, scientific & technical 30 12 21 15 26 18 
Education & training 32 13 14 10 17 12 
Public administration and safety 23 9 9 6 6 4 
Other services 18 7 7 5 5 3 
Maori trust 12 5 6 4 6 4 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 11 4 6 4 3 2 
Wholesale, retail and other services 4 2 3 2 5 3 
Administrative & support 5 2 3 2 2 1 
Manufacturing 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Construction 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Subtotal 188 54 71 50 72 50 
       
Prior ITP representation subtotal 49 19 0 0 0 0 
       
Total 256 100 142 100 144 100 
* Prior ITP representation is detailed at the end of Table 5
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Table 7: Professional Work Experience  
 
 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 
 n % n % n % 
       
All appointments       
Management consulting 63 25 43 30 41 28 
Education 41 16 24 17 27 19 
Accounting-banking -finance  33 13 33 23 36 25 
Engineering 12 5 8 6 7 5 
Law 8 3 5 4 5 3 
Science 5 2 4 3 5 3 
Sales-Marketing 5 2 7 5 8 6 
Other 40 16 18 13 15 10 
Prior ITP representation* 49 19 0 0 0 0 
Total  256 100 142 100 144 100 
       
Government appointments       
Management consulting 16 6 20 14 20 14 
Education 13 5 11 8 12 8 
Accounting-banking -finance  16 6 22 15 23 16 
Engineering 5 2 3 2 3 2 
Law 3 1 4 3 3 2 
Science 3 1 2 1 2 1 
Sales-Marketing 3 1 3 2 3 2 
Other 9 4 6 4 6 4 
Subtotal 68 27 71 50 72 50 
       
Non-government appointments       
Management consulting 47 18 23 16 21 15 
Education 28 11 13 9 15 10 
Accounting-banking -finance  17 7 11 8 13 9 
Engineering 7 3 5 4 4 3 
Law 5 2 1 1 2 1 
Science 2 1 2 1 3 2 
Sales-Marketing 2 1 4 3 5 3 
Other 31 12 12 8 9 6 
Subtotal 139 54 71 50 72 50 
       
Prior ITP representation subtotal 49 19 0 0 0 0 
       
Total  256 100 142 100 144 100 
* Prior ITP representation is detailed at the end of Table 5 
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Table 8: Prior Senior Experience in Governance and Operations 
 
Panel A: Prior Director Experience  
 
 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 
 n % n % n % 
       
All appointments       
Company - unlisted 103 40 83 58 89 62 
Trustee of trust or charity 19 7 17 12 16 11 
Company - listed 1 0 1 1 3 2 
No previous experience 76 30 37 26 32 22 
Other unspecified 8 3 4 3 4 3 
Prior ITP representation*   49 19 0 0 0 0 
Total  256 100 142 100 144 100 
       
Government appointments       
Company - unlisted 40 16 52 37 52 36 
Trustee of trust or charity 4 2 7 5 7 5 
Company - listed 1 0 1 1 3 2 
No previous experience 20 8 10 7 9 6 
Other unspecified 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Subtotal 68 27 71 50 72 50 
       
Non-government appointments       
Company - unlisted 63 25 31 22 37 26 
Trustee of trust or charity 15 6 10 7 9 6 
Company - listed 0 0 0 0 0 0 
No previous experience 56 22 27 19 23 16 
Other unspecified 5 2 3 2 3 2 
Subtotal 139 54 71 50 72 50 
       
Prior ITP representation subtotal 49 19 0 0 0 0 
       
Total  256 100 142 100 144 100 
* Prior ITP representation is detailed at the end of Table 5 
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Panel B: Prior Executive Director Experience  
 
 
Year 
2009 2010 2011 
 n % n % n % 
All appointments       
CEO/Managing Director 113 44 83 58 85 59 
Divisional Manager 40 16 27 19 31 22 
COO/CFO 9 4 11 8 11 8 
No previous experience 24 9 17 12 15 10 
Other unspecified 21 8 4 3 2 1 
Prior ITP representation* 49 19 0 0 0 0 
Total  256 100 142 100 144 100 
       
Government appointments       
CEO/Managing Director 42 16 46 32 47 33 
Divisional Manager 12 5 13 9 13 9 
COO/CFO 3 1 6 4 6 4 
No previous experience 7 3 6 4 6 4 
Other unspecified 4 2 0 0 0 0 
Subtotal 68 27 71 50 72 50 
       
Non-government appointments       
CEO/Managing Director 71 28 37 26 38 26 
Divisional Manager 28 11 14 10 18 13 
COO/CFO 6 2 5 4 5 3 
No previous experience 17 7 11 8 9 6 
Other unspecified 17 7 4 3 2 1 
Subtotal 139 54 71 50 72 50 
       
Prior ITP representation subtotal 49 19 0 0 0 0 
       
Total  256 100 142 100 144 100 
* Prior ITP representation is detailed at the end of Table 5 
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